A
Model of the Policy Implementation Process
Our basic model - as depicted in Figure 3-posits six
variables which shape the linkage between policy and performance. This model
not only specifies the relationships between the independent variables and the
ultimate dependent variable of interest, but also makes explicit the relationships
among the independent variables. The linkages included implicitly represent
hypotheses which could be tested empirically, assuming that satisfactory
indicators could 'be constructed and appropriate data collected. By approaching
the problem in this manner, there is greater promise for elucidating the
processes whereby policy decisions are carried out than simply by correlating
.independent and dependent variables in a relatively unthinking fashion (Van
Meter and Asher, 1973). The model has been constructed on the basis of the
three bodies of literature cited above, as well as the authors' own research
and intuitions about the implementation process. (p.462)
Policy
Standards and Objectives
Given our primary interest in the factors that
determine the performance of policy, the
identification of performance indicators is a crucial stage in the analysis.
Essentially, the performance indicators assess the extent to which the policy's
standards and objectives are realized. Standards and objectives elaborate on
the overall goals. of the policy decision. They move beyond the generalities of
the legislative document to provide concrete and more specific standards for
assessing program performance. These standards and objectives are self-evident
and easily measurable in some cases. For instance, the Economic Development
Administration's Oakland Project sought to create jobs for the unemployed
through several public works projects (e.g., the construction of an airport
hangar, marine terminal, port industrial park, and an access road to the city's
newly built coliseum) [Pressman and
Wildavsky, 1973]. To ascertain whether implementation has been successful, one
must determine the number of jobs that have been created, the identity of those
who have been hired, and the progress on the related public works projects. (p.462-464)
In most cases it is much more difficult to identify
and measure performance. This may be due to the program's breadth or the
complex and far-reaching nature of its goals. It may also be a consequence of
ambiguities and contradictions in the statement of standards and objectives. It
should be recognized that ambiguity in 'standards and objectives may be fostered
deliberately by policy makers in order to ensure a positive response on the
part of those responsible for implementation at other levels of the organization
on the policy delivery system. Yet the study of implementation requires that
goals and objectives be identified and measured since "implementation.
cannot succeed or fail without a goal against which to judge it "
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: xiv). In determining standards and objectives
one could use the statements of policy makers, as reflected in numerous documents
such as program regulations and guidelines which spell out the criteria for an
evaluation of policy performance. In some cases, however, the policy's standards
and objectives will have to be deduced by the individual researcher. And one may
even wish to use the criteria for evaluation of policy performance provided by
clientele groups. Ultimately, the choice of performance measures depends on the
purposes for which the research is conducted (Rivlin, 1971; Rossi and Williams,
1972). (p.464-465)
Policy
Resources
Policies furnish more than the standards and
objectives against which to judge implementation: they also make available
resources which facilitate their administration. These resources may include
funds or other incentives in the program that might encourage or facilitate effective
implementation. (For a more detailed discussion of the utility of incentives,
see Levine, 1972, and Schultze, 1969) It is obvious that funds are usually not
adequate. In fact, Derthick's (1972: 87) “new-towns" study suggests that
the limited. supply of federal incentives was a major contributor to the
failure of the program: “To induce local
governments to accept the burden of developing new towns in-town, the federal
government had to give them something of value. The President assumed that
low-cost surplus land would be available for this purpose, but this assumption
turned out to be wrong.” (p.465)
Four additional factors are included in our model: inter
organizational communication and enforcement activities; the characteristics on
the implementing agencies; the economic, social, and political environment
affecting the jurisdiction or organization within which.. implementation takes
place; and the disposition of implementers. Each of these factors consists of
several variables, some of which will be identified here. (p.465)
Interorganizational
Communication and Enforcement Activities
Effective implementation requires that a program's
standards and objectives be understood by those individuals responsible for
their achievement. Hence, it is vital that concern ourselves with the clarity of
standards and objectives, the accuracy of .their communication to implementers,
and the consistency (or uniformity): with which they are communicated by
various sources of information. Standards and objectives cannot be carried out
unless they are stated with sufficient clarity so that implementers can know
what is expected of them. Communication within and between organizations is a
complex and difficult process. In transmitting messages downward in an
organization, or from one organization to another, communicators inevitably
distort them-both intentionally and unintentionally (Downs, 1967:133-136).
Furthermore, if different sources of communication provide inconsistent
interpretations of standards and objectives or if the same source provides
conflicting interpretations
over
time, implementers will find it even more difficult to carry out the intentions
of policy. Therefore, the prospects of effective implementation will be
enhanced by the clarity with which standards and objectives are stated and by
the accuracy and consistency with which they are communicated. (p.465-466)
Successful implementation often requires
institutional mechanisms and procedures whereby higher authorities (superiors)
may increase the likelihood that implementers (subordinates) will act in a manner
consistent with a policy's standards and objectives. As Neustadt (1960: J8);
has observed with respect to presidential directives, orders are not
self-executing: they require the presence of an action forcing mechanism.
(p.466)
Within the context of a single organization
superiors have access to a wide range of such mechanisms. They have the standard personnel powers: recruitment
and selection, assignment and. relocation, advancement and promotion, and
ultimately, dismissal. Moreover, they have control over the budgetary allocations
of bureaus and field offices which they may inflate or reduce in response to
satisfactory or unsatisfactory performance. While they cannot command obedience,
superiors have substantial capacity to influence their subordinates behavior.(p.466-467)
In contrast, when we examine the relationships among
members of different organization - or among federal, state, and local
officials - many of these mechanisms are absent. Schultze (1969: 202) has
summarized this condition:
actions cannot be commanded. There is no
hierarchy of officials in a single line of command who can be directed toward a
set of predetermined objectives. In such cases the careful specification of
plans and objectives by a public agency will not suffice to guarantee effective
programs. (p.467)
In the context of inter organizational (or intergovernmental)
relations, two types of enforcement or follow-up activities are most important.
First technical advice and assistance can be provided. Higher level officials can often do much to
facilitate implementation by aiding subordinates in interpreting federal
regulations and guidelines, structuring responses to policy initiatives, and
obtaining the physical and technical resources required to carry out a policy.
(p.467)
Second, superiors (or federal officials) can rely on
a wide variety of sanctions-both positive and negative. We can explore this
aspect of enforcement by referring back to Etzioni’s (1961: 5-8) distinction
between normative, remunerative, and coercive power. Even though the federal government
is not a "superior" in its relations with states and localities, by
extending the analogy we can use this notion as an ordering device for thinking
about inter organizational relations and the role of enforcement. (p.467)
The use of normative and remunerative powers is most
common. For example, the federal government seeks to influence state and local
activity through the allocation and manipulation of symbolic and material rewards.
One of the most important techniques of
federal influence is the socialization, persuasion, and cooptation of state and local actors. By
attempting to build a professional alliance around the organization and its
mission, federal officials will try to cultivate allies at the state and local 1evel
who will implement their policies willfully. The fragmentation of the federal system
adds significance to this technique, since it makes monitoring' effective and
oversight virtually impossible (see, for example, Kaufman, 1960; Derthick,
1970; Bailey and Mosher, 1968; and Etzioni, 1965). (p.467-468)
Another way to achieve' influence is to get states
and localities to participate in a program. The prospect of receiving federal
do~lars is often sufficient to secure their participation and at least implicit
acceptance of the objectives of federal policy. This is a significant beginning
point. Research has shown that the amount of federal influence over aspects .of
a program increases as the percentage of the federal contribution rises (Porter,
1973: 85; Derthick, 1970: 69-70). (p.468)
Finally, federal officials may induce state' and.
Local participation and cooperation by rendering valuable services. For
example, many grants do this by offering a healthy percentage of program funds
for administration at the state and local level; and such crucial support
services - technical advice, staff loans, and research - may be offered to
participating organizations. (p.468)
Federal officials also have 'more compelling devices
at their disposal, which range from gentle to explicit forms of coercive power.
A common practice is to require states and localities to draw up elaborate
plans for the administration of a federal program. Once these assurances are
made, the federal government will allocate funds, on the assumption that they
can be withdrawn if the conditions specified in the plan are not fulfilled.
Through this device, federal officials seek "compliance in advance"
(Derthick, 1970: 209). (p.468)
A simi1ar strategy is to specify conditions and
procedural requirements, such as thorough reporting and accounting systems, in the
regulations that accompany the acceptance of federal funds. In this manner the
federal government hopes to achieve the substantive ends of federal objectives.
As Derthick (1970: 200) points out, however, there are dangers in this
procedure:
Specificity entails risks. . . .The more
specific the language of the federal requirements, the lower the federal
capacity to adapt to state peculiarities and the greater the danger that the limitations
of federal capacity to compel conformance may be revealed. (p.469)
Moreover, stringent regulations and guidelines may
induce a sort of goal displacement, wherein state and local officials strive to
meet federal requirements in order to obtain funds and avoid sanctions, while
ignoring the basic mission of the program. (p.469)
Recognizing these problems, federal officials tend
to employ more reliable forms of surveillance. Such activities include on-site
visitations, program evaluations, administrative and management reviews,
audits, and other feedback mechanisms-including reports by nongovernmental
advisory committees set up to oversee state, and local governmental units (see,
for example, Downs, 1967: 145-153; Blau and Scott, 1962: 170-172; and Kaufman,
1973). Wilensky (1967: 60-61) adds an important caveat, however, on the
limitations of oversight: (p.469)
Where field or branch products and local
operating conditions vary, surveillance machinery proliferates. Such machinery is
often ineffectual-especially where the local people must submit to inspection
either by those outside their profession or specially or by those of different
ideological persuasions… Where the… doctrinal distance between the inspectors
is great, the resulting information blockage may imperil top leaders' awareness
of and accommodation to local problems as well as their ability to communicate
new goals to local units. (p.469-450)
Perhaps the most threatening form of federal
influence is the power to withdraw or withhold funds from states and localities.
This is the ultimate weapon in the federal government's arsenal of influence.
However, this weapon is rarely used. It may cause embarrassment for all
concerned and damage the only ally which the federal government has in the area-the
state or local implementing agency. Generally, the federal government
negotiates with state and local officials in an effort to attain the greatest possible
compliance without withholding funds. Thus, federal officials usually refrain
from overt threats which could undermine cooperative relations with
implementers and generate congressional hostility-at the expense of program
goals (Derthick, 1970: 207-214). A more common practice is the audit exception
where certain amounts of money are required to be returned to the federal
treasury (see The National Advisory Council on the Education of Disadvantaged
Children, 1972, for an example of Office of Education action). Finally, the
mere knowledge of the ability of the federal government to withhold funds and
the awareness of a regularized process of audit discovery can act as powerful deterrents
to errant behavior (errant, that is, from the superior's perspective). (p.470)
The
Characteristics of the Implementing Agencies
Numerous factors are included in this component of
the model. Students of bureaucratic politics have identified many characteristics
of administrative agencies that affect their policy performance. Ripley et al.
(1973: to), for example speak of bureaucratic structure as those
"characteristics, norms, and recurring patterns of relations inside the
executive agencies that have either potential or actual relation to what they
do in the way of policy." (p.470)
Like Ripley, we view this component as consisting of
both the formal structural features of
organizations and the informal attributes of their personnel. We are also
interested in the implementing agency's ties to other participants in the policy
delivery system. Without trying to provide an exhaustive listing of these
elements we offer the following suggestions of characteristics that may impinge
on an organization's capacity to implement policy:
(a) the competence and size of an
agency's staff;
(b) the degree
of hierarchical control of subunit decisions and processes within the
implementing agencies;
(c) an agency's
political resources (e.g., support among legislators and executives);
(d) the vitality of an organization;
(e) the degree
of "open" communications (ie.,
networks of communication with free horizontal and vertical communication, and
a relatively high degree of freedom in communications with persons outside the
organization) within an organization;
(f) the agency's
formal and informal linkages with the “policy making" or “policy - enforcing"
body. (p.471)
Economic,
Social, and Political Conditions
The impact of economic, social, and political
conditions on public policy has been the focus of much attention during the
past decade. Students of comparative state politics and public policy have been
particularly interested in identifying the influence of these environmental
variables on policy outputs (see, for example, Sharkansky, 1967, 1971;
Sharkansky and Hofferbert, 1969; Cnudde and McCrone, 1969; Dye, 1966; Hofferbert,
1964). Although the impact of these factors on the implementation of policy
decisions has received little attention, they may have a profound effect on the
performance of implementing agencies. (p.471)
For illustrative purposes, we propose that
consideration given to the following questions regarding the economic, social,
and political environment affecting the jurisdiction or the organization within
which implementation takes place:
a) Are the
economic resources available within the implementing jurisdiction (or
organization) sufficient to support successful implementation?
(b) To what
extent (and how) will prevailing economic and social conditions be affected by
the implementation of the policy in question?
(c) What is the
nature of public opinion; how salient is the related policy issue?
(d) Do elites
favor or oppose implementation of the policy?
(e) What is the
partisan character of the implementing jurisdiction (or organization); is there
partisan opposition or support for the poli?
(f) To what
extent are private interest groups mobilized in support or opposition to the
policy? (p.472)
THE
DISPOSITION OF IMPLEMENTORS
Each of the components of the model discussed above must
be filtered through the perceptions of the implementer within the jurisdiction
where the policy is delivered. Their elements of the implementers' response may
affect their ability and willingness to carry out the policy: their cognition (comprehension,
understanding) of the policy, the direction of their response toward it
(acceptance, neutrality, rejection), and the intensity of that response.
(p.472)
The implementers understanding of the general intent,
as well as the specific standards and objectives of the policy, is important.
Moreover, successful implementation may be frustrated when officials are not
aware that the are not in full compliance with the policy. We have already
dealt with some aspects of this phenomenon. Yet we want to emphasize, that
implementers may screen out a clear message when the decision seems to
contradict deeply cherished beliefs. Under circumstances of cognitive dissonance
(Festinger; 1957), the individual may attempt to bring the displeasing message
into balance with his perception of ~hat the decision ought to have been (see,
for example, Wasby, 1970: 98).
(p.472-473)
The direction of implementers' dispositions toward
the standards and objectives is crucial also, Implementers may fail to execute
policies faithfully because they reject the goals contained in them (see, for example,
Peltatason, f96l; Dolbeare and Hammond, 1971; Etzioni, 1961; Wasby, 1970; and Derthick,
1970). Conversely, widespread acceptance of the policy's standards and
objectives, on the part of those responsible for administering it, will enhance
greatly the potential for successful execution (Kaufman, 1960). At minimum, it
would seem that share attitudes will make implementation easier. The goals of a
policy may be rejected for a variety of reason: they may offend implementers' personal
value systems, extra organizational loyalties, sense of self-interest, or
existing and preferred relationships. Summarizing this phenomenon, Petrick
(1968: 7) has written that it "arises from the fact that human groups find
it difficult to carry out effectively acts for which they have no underlying beliefs."
(p.473)
Finally, the intensity of implementers' dispositions
may affect the performance of the policy. Those holding intense negative
preferences may be led to outright and open defiance. of the program's
objectives. When this occurs the implementation question may become moot - subordinates
(e.g., states and localities) may refuse to participate in' the' program
altogether (see Bailey and Mosher, 1968). Less intense attitudes may cause implementers
to attempt surreptitious diversion and evasion, a more common pattern (see, for
example. Lazin, 1973). In these circumstances one may have to look to the role
of oversight and enforcement to explain variations in the effectiveness of
implementation. What all this suggests is that the researcher must gather
multiple indicators of various elements of the dispositions of policy implementers.
(p.473-474)
Hypothesized
Linkages between Components of the Model
Although our discussion will be presented in static
terms, it is important that the dynamic character of the implementation process
be recognized. Factors that may affect the execution of a policy in its initial
stages may be of little consequence at a later point in time. Hence, it is
vital that the study of implementation be conducted longitudinally;
relationships identified at one point in time must not be extended casually to
other time periods. With this in mind, let us describe and justify briefly some
hypothesized relationships (see Figure 3). (p.474)
The standards and objectives of policies have an
indirect effect on performance; what influence this component has on dependent variable is mediated by other independent
variables. Obviously, the delivery of public services will be influenced by the
manner in which standards and objectives are communicated to implementers and the extent to
which standards and objectives facilitate oversight and enforcement. Standards and
objectives have their indirect impact on the disposition of implementers
through inter organizational communication activities. Clearly, implementers
respond. Some policy will be based, in
part, on their perceptions and interpretations of its objectives. This is not
to suggest that good communication necessarily contributes to a positive disposition
on the part of implementers. However, variations in implementers' support for
federal policies ultimately, may be explained partially in terms of their
understanding and interpretation of these standards and objectives. as well as
the manner by which they are-communicated. (p.474)
Standards and objectives also have an indirect
impact the disposition of implementers through enforcement activities. They
provide the foundation on which superiors can rely in their relations with
policy implementers in other organizations. For example, standards and
objectives may establish limits on the sanctions that can be employed
legitimately by superiors; and they help define the amount of discretion afforded
implementing agencies. Where the power to with hold funds is authorized,
various forms of coercive power are also possible. Where withholding is not
permitted, however, superiors may be forced to rely exclusively on normative
and remunerative powers. Enforcement and follow - up activities may alter the
dispositions of implementers, causing them to see the advantages of
participation, and quite possibly the disadvantages of resisting effective
implementation. Alternatively, by employing coercion, enforcing officials can
sometimes secure the compliance of implementing officials without affecting
their dispositions about the program. For example, the use of audit exceptions
can deter implementers from using funds in a manner inconsistent with a
program's standards and objectives, even though implementing officials may
continue to question their desirability. (p.475)
We posit linkages between policy resources and three
other components of the model. The type and extent of resources made available
by a policy decision will affect
communications and enforcement activities. Technical assistance and other
services can only be offered if provided by the policy decision. Furthermore,
vigorous enforcement can be achieved only if the available resources are
sufficient to support such activity. Similarly, the disposition of implementers
can be influenced directly by the availability of resources. When vast sums of
money or other resources are perceived to be available, implementers may view
the program with added favor, and compliance may be encouraged by the prospect
of receiving a share of these resources. Conversely, support for a program will
not be encouraged if implementers perceive that few benefits will be realized by
active participation. (p.475-476)
The linkage between resources and the economic, social,
and political environment of the implementing jurisdiction (or organization)
suggest that the availability of fiscal and other resources may create a demand
by private citizens and organized interest groups for participation in and successful
implementation of the program. Again, the prospect of benefiting from the
program may cause otherwise quiescent groups to press for maximum participation.
However, where limited resources are made available, individual citizens and organized
interests may choose to oppose the policy on the grounds that the benefits of
participation are few compared to the potential costs (e.g., a loss of state or
local autonomy, or a restructuring of established relationships. (p.476)
It is also hypothesized that the economic, social,
and political environment of the implementing jurisdiction (or organization) will
affect the character of the implementing agencies, the dispositions of implementers,
and performance itself. Environmental
conditions can have a significant effect on the willingness and capacity of a
jurisdiction (or organization) to support well–developed bureaucratic
structures, the vitality and expertise found in administrative agencies, as
well as the level of political support enjoyed an agency. Environmental conditions
will also affect the dispositions implementers. Where the problems to be remedied
by a program are severe and private citizens and interest groups are mobilized
in support of a program, it is more likely the implementers may accept the
policy's goals, standards, and objectives. Conversely, where problems are not severe
and organized interests are lined up against a program, implementers may be
encouraged to look with disfavor on the program requiring implementation.
Environmental conditions may cause implementers to execute a policy without
altering their personal preferences about that policy. Implementers desire to
minimize public hostility or their ideologically based inclination to be
responsive to public wishes may influence their behavior, event tough it may be
inconsistent with their own preferences. Finally, these environmental variables
are seen as having a direct effect on the delivery of public services. Despite
the dispositions of implementers and other forces in the model, these
environmental conditions may enhance or place limits on performance.
(p.476-477)
Several characteristics of implementing agencies can
affect the dispositions of their personal. The nature of the communications
network, the degree of hierarchical control, and the style of leadership can
influence the individual’s identification with the organization’s goals and
objectives, either facilitating of the implementing agency. Dispositions can
also be influenced by the agency’s formal and informal ties to the
“policy-making” or “policy-enforcing” body (e.g., do they operate at the same
level of government? Has an effective alliance been built between higher
authorities and implementing officials?) (p.477)
We suggest the possibility of an interactive
effect between inter organizational communication and enforcement activities and
the characteristics of implementing agencies. Enforcement and follow-up activities
can provide the implementing agencies with added vitality and
expertise-improving their capacity to execute programs. They can also be a
source of political support which can facilitate affective implementation. The
nature of enforcement and follow-up activities, including the provision of
technical assistance, will be influenced by the characteristics of the
implementing agencies. Since many of the enforcement mechanisms available to superiors
operating within a single organization cannot be utilized when implementation
requires inter organizational or intergovernmental cooperation, the type of power
used by superiors (e.g., normative, remunerative, or coercive) will be affected
by the formal and informal relationships between the policy-making and
implementing organizations. Also, in choosing among alternative methods of
enforcement and follow-up actions, superiors can be expected to be sensitive to
characteristics of the implementing agencies. Agencies possessing competent
staffs and leadership will require different types of assistance than those that
are poorly staffed and led. Similarly, implementing agencies with limited'
political resources may be more vulnerable to coercive power than agencies that
enjoy extensive support among private citizens and public officials.
(p.477-478)
Van Meter, Donald S. and Van Horn, Carl E., 1975. “The
Policy Implementation Process. A Conceptual Framework”. Administration
and Society, Vol.6 No.4. London: Sage Publications, Inc.